Abstract-The rapid growth of online social networks has strengthened wireless users' social relationships, which in turn has resulted in more data traffic due to network effect in the social domain. Nevertheless, the boosted demand for wireless services may challenge the limited wireless capacity. To build a thorough understanding, we study mobile users' data usage behavior by jointly considering the network effect due to their social relationships in the social domain and the congestion effect in the physical wireless domain. Specifically, we develop a Stackelberg game for socially aware data usage: in Stage I, a wireless provider first decides the data pricing to all users in order to maximize its revenue, and then in Stage II, users decide their data usage, for the given price, subject to mutual interactions under both social network effect and congestion effect. We analyze the two-stage game via backward induction. In particular, for Stage II, we first provide conditions for the existence and the uniqueness of a user demand equilibrium (UDE). Then, we propose algorithms to find the UDE and for users to reach the UDE in a distributed manner. We further investigate the impact of different system parameters on the UDE. Next, for Stage I, we develop an optimal pricing algorithm to maximize the wireless provider's revenue. We numerically evaluate the performance of our proposed algorithms using real data, and thereby draw useful engineering insights for the operation of wireless providers: 1) when social network effect dominates congestion effect, the marginal gain of the total usage increases with the social ties and the number of users, or decreases with the congestion coefficient; in contrast, when congestion effect dominates social network effect, the marginal gain decreases (or increases, respectively) with these parameters and 2) when social network effect is strong, a lower price should be set to increase the total revenue; in 
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE past few years have witnessed pervasive penetration of mobile devices in people's daily life, thanks to the wireless technology advances. Motivated by many social applications on mobile platforms (e.g., WeChat [1] , WhatsApp [2] ), mobile users' data usage behavior has been increasingly influenced by their social relationships. In 2014, the number of online social media users on mobile platforms has reached 1.6 billion, accounting for 44% of mobile users and 80% of online social media users [3] .
The popularity of social services on mobile platforms [4] also gives opportunities to wireless service providers. Intuitively, social services can encourage mobile users to demand more data usage by stimulating their interactions with each other through these services (e.g., online social gaming and blogging). When a user increases its activity in a social service, its social friends are likely to increase their activities accordingly. Therefore, users' data usage for social services result in network effect on others. In general, network effect refers to the positive effect that one user of a product or service has on the value of that product or service to other users [5] . The increase in mobile users' data usage demand due to the social network effect 1 provides a great potential for wireless providers' revenue increase.
However, this potential benefit is subject to the limited wireless capacity in physical communication networks. As users increase their data usage, they may experience higher congestion (e.g., service delays), which discourages them to use more. In fact, the increasing congestion poses a significant challenge for wireless providers to increase their revenues [6] .
As a result, mobile users' data usage behavior is not only subject to congestion effect in the physical network, but also network effect in the social domain (as illustrated in Fig. 1 ), which nevertheless has been largely overlooked by wireless providers. To fully exploit the potential benefit brought by social services, it is of great interest to investigate users' data usage behavior in these two domains in a holistic manner, so that a wireless provider can take the best strategy in favor of its revenue. With this insight, we analyze users' interactions subject to both network effect and congestion effect, and study the optimal pricing strategy for the wireless provider accordingly. To our best knowledge, this paper is the first to study users' behavior under both network effect and congestion effect and the corresponding pricing strategy of the provider.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• Stackelberg game formulation under both network effect and congestion effect: By jointly considering users' social relationships and the wireless network's congestion, we formulate the interaction between a wireless provider and mobile users as a Stackelberg game: In Stage I, the wireless provider determines a price to control the total usage in order to maximize its revenue; in Stage II, mobile users choose their data usage based on the price to maximize their socially-aware payoffs.
• Analysis of user demand equilibrium in Stage II: We first
show that under certain conditions, there exists a user demand equilibrium (UDE), and furthermore, the UDE is unique. Then we propose an algorithm to find the UDE, and also a distributed algorithm to achieve the UDE. Next we characterize users' usage at the UDE, and analyze the impacts of system parameters on the UDE. In particular, we have two interesting findings: 1) when users have diverse intrinsic valuations, as the price increases, a user's usage does not always decrease but may increase, which is in contrast with the case when users have homogeneous intrinsic valuations; 2) when users have asymmetric social ties, as a user's intrinsic valuation or social tie levels increase, users' total usage does not always increase but may decrease, which is in contrast with the case when users have symmetric social ties.
• Provider's optimal pricing in Stage I: Finally, by taking into account users' equilibrium demands in Stage II, we study optimal pricing which maximizes the revenue of the wireless provider. We use real data to numerically evaluate the performance of total usage and revenue, and draw useful engineering insights for the wireless provider's operation: When network effect dominates congestion effect, the marginal gain of the total usage increases as social tie levels or the number of users increase, or as the congestion coefficient decreases; in contrast, when congestion effect dominates network effect, the marginal gain decreases as those parameters increase or decrease respectively. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related work. In Section III, we formulate the Stackelberg game between the wireless provider and mobile users. Section IV studies users' demand equilibrium in Stage II. Section V studies the provider's optimal pricing in Stage I. Simulation results and discussions are given in Section VI. Section VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
There have been many studies (e.g., [7] , [9] - [11] ) on users' behavior and the provider's pricing when either network effect (also known as positive externality) or congestion effect (also known as negative externality) is present, respectively. In [7] , different pricing strategies of a provider have been studied where users' behavior is subject to network effect only. When users experience both network effect and congestion effect as considered in this paper, the coupling among users is very different and more complex than when only network effect is present in [7] . For example, while a user's usage always decreases as price increases when only network effect is present in [7] , it can increase with price when congestion effect is also present as shown in this paper. In addition, while each user's usage always increases as users' intrinsic valuations or social ties improve in [7] , in this paper we show that some users' usage may decrease with these parameters such that the total usage decreases. To account for congestion effect, the analysis of this paper is also very different from that in [7] . For example, while [7] uses supermodular game [12] to show the uniqueness of the equilibrium, the game in this paper is not a supermodular game, and we use concave game [13] to show the uniqueness of the equilibrium. In addition, while we analyze the impact of different parameters (i.e., price, intrinsic coefficients, social ties, congestion coefficient) on the equilibrium, [7] focuses on the impact of price. Very few work [8] have studied the case where both network effect and congestion effect are present. However, [8] does not consider pricing, and it assumes that all users have the same utility functions, which does not capture the fact that users experience different levels of network effect based on their diverse social ties as considered in this paper. The major differences of this paper with [7] and [8] are summarized in Table. I.
The social aspect of mobile networking is an emerging paradigm for network design and optimization. Social contact patterns have been exploited for efficient data forwarding and dissemination in delay tolerant networks [14] , [15] . Social trust and social reciprocity have been leveraged in [16] to enhance cooperative D2D communication based on a coalitional game. A social group utility maximization (SGUM) framework has been recently studied in [17] - [19] , which captures the impact of mobile users' diverse social ties on the interactions of their mobile devices subject to diverse physical relationships.
Pricing in communication networks has been studied extensively in literature [20] - [25] . As users typically share limited resources in communication networks, congestion effect on users' behavior is common and has been investigated by many works [20] , [26] . To our best knowledge, the interplay between network effect and congestion effect on users' behavior in communication networks has not been explored.
While part of this work has been presented in [27] , more analytical results have been added in this paper. In particular, [7] , [8] it is shown that when certain condition does not hold, there can exist multiple UDEs. It is also shown that when the social ties are asymmetric, as a user's intrinsic valuation or social ties increase, some other users' usage may decrease such that the total usage decreases. These results also demonstrate that the conditions assumed in Theorem 2 and Proposition 5 are sensible. This paper has also extended Section I to provide a comprehensive presentation of the background, motivation, and contributions of this work, and Section II to provide an extensive discussion of related work. The proofs of all main results have also been presented in details in this paper.
III. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Socially-Aware Wireless Service
Consider a set of users N {1, . . . , N} participating in a wireless service provided by a wireless operator (e.g., AT&T). Each user i ∈ N consumes data usage of an amount x i in the wireless service where x i ∈ [0, ∞). Let x (x 1 , . . . , x N ) denote the usage profile of all the users and x −i denote the usage profile without user i . Affected by the other users' usage subject to congestion effect due to limited resources in the wireless network, user i 's payoff v i by consuming data usage x i is given by
where a i > 0 and b i > 0 are intrinsic coefficients that capture user i 's intrinsic valuation of the wireless service, c > 0 is a congestion coefficient that is determined by the resource constraints of the wireless network, and p is a usagebased price charged by the wireless provider. 2 As in [7] , the quadratic form of the intrinsic utility function not only facilitates tractable analysis, but also serves as a good secondorder approximation for a broad class of concave utility functions. In particular, a i models the maximum intrinsic demand rate, and b i models the intrinsic demand elasticity factor. For the congestion model, the quadratic sum form reflects that a user's congestion experience is affected by all the users, and the marginal cost of congestion increases as the total usage increases.
The wireless provider's current operation does not take into account the fact that social services encourage mobile users to demand more data usage. To account for this effect, we modify user i 's payoff as u i to include social utility, which is given by
in which g i j ≥ 0 is the strength of user i 's social tie with user j that quantifies the marginal social effect of user j on user i . As in [7] , the product form of the social utility function captures that a user derives more utility from the social service as its usage increases, and the marginal gain of social utility increases as its social friends increase their usage. Therefore, social services bring in network effect among users and can increase their utilities.
B. Stackelberg Game Formulation
We model the interaction between the wireless provider and mobile users for the socially-aware wireless service as a two-stage Stackelberg game.
Definition 1 (Two-Stage Pricing-Usage Game):
The wireless provider chooses price p to maximize its revenue:
where t (x) i∈N x i denotes the total usage under strategy profile x; • Stage II (Usage): Each user i ∈ N chooses its data usage x i to maximize its payoff given the price p and the other users' usage x −i :
We study the two-stage pricing-usage game by backward induction [28] . For Stage II, given a price chosen by the wireless provider in Stage I, we are interested in the existence of a stable outcome of users' interactions at which no user will deviate. This leads to the concept of user demand equilibrium.
Definition 2 (User Demand Equilibrium): For any price p given in Stage I, the user demand equilibrium (UDE) in Stage II is a strategy profile x * such that no user can improve its payoff by unilaterally changing its usage, i.e., 
IV. USER DEMAND EQUILIBRIUM IN STAGE II
Following the principle of backward induction [28] , in this section, we first study users' demand equilibrium in Stage II.
Using the concave payoff function in (1), by setting the firstorder derivative as
= 0, we obtain the best response function of user i as
According to (2) , each user i 's usage demand consists of two parts: intrinsic demand 
A. Existence and Uniqueness of a UDE
We first investigate the existence of a UDE in Stage II.
the Stage II game admits a UDE. The proof is given in Appendix A. Note that (3) is an important condition to guarantee the existence of a UDE, as there can exist no UDE when it does not hold (as illustrated by an example in Fig. 2 ).
Next we give a further condition under which the game admits a unique UDE.
Theorem 2: When condition (3) holds and
the Stage II game admits a unique UDE. The proof is given in Appendix B, with the main idea being to show that the game is a concave game [13] and thus admits a unique UDE. Fig. 3 gives an illustrative example where multiple UDEs exist when condition (4) does not hold. 
Algorithm 1 Find the UDE in Stage II
For tractable analysis, 3 for the rest of this paper, we assume that conditions (3) and (4) hold so that the UDE exists and is unique.
Remarks: According to Theorem 2, it is worth noting that the Stage II game admits a unique UDE when users' social ties are symmetric (i.e., g i j = g j i , ∀i = j ). The symmetric setting of social networks is of great interest. Motivated by the idea of social reciprocity [29] , a user's social behavior to another is likely to imitate the latter's behavior to the former. As a result, two users' social ties with each other tend to be the same.
B. Finding and Achieving the UDE
Having shown the existence and the uniqueness of UDE, we next design an algorithm to find the UDE, as described in Algorithm 1. The algorithm iteratively updates users' strategies based on their best response functions in (2) and converges to the UDE.
Theorem 3: The UDE in Stage II can be found by Algorithm 1.
The proof is given in Appendix C, with the main idea being to show that the best response updates in the algorithm result in a contraction mapping and hence converges to a fixed point. Then we show that users can achieve the UDE in a distributed manner. We propose a distributed best response update algorithm similar to Algorithm 1, as described in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Achieve the UDE in a distributed manner in Stage II
Note that in Algorithm 2, each user in fact chooses its best response usage according to (2) . The correctness of Algorithm 2 follows from that of Algorithm 1 and is thus omitted.
Proposition 1: The UDE in Stage II can be achieved by Algorithm 2.
C. Analysis at the UDE
We first investigate the impact of price on the UDE. To draw clear insights, we start with the case of two users. Without loss of generality, assume that a 1 ≥ a 2 . 
such that the UDE x * (as a function of p) is given as follows:
• High price regime:
The proof is given in Appendix D. According to (5) , there are three cases of the threshold p th depending on which effect is the net effect of user 1 on user 2 (as illustrated in Fig. 4 ): 1) Neither effect: When g 21 = c, we have p th = a 2 .
As network effect and congestion effect cancel each other, user 2 experiences neither social network effect nor congestion effect from user 1. Thus user 2's usage demand is equal to its intrinsic demand, and it reaches 0 when p = a 2 . 2) Congestion effect: When g 21 < c, we have p th < a 2 .
As user 2 experiences congestion effect from user 1, even when p is less than a 2 such that user 2 has a positive intrinsic demand, its external demand can be sufficiently negative such that user 2's usage demand is negative. In particular, when
, user 2's usage is 0 even when p is 0. 3) Network effect: When g 21 > c, we have p th > a 2 .
As user 2 experiences network effect from user 1, even when p is greater than a 2 such that user 2 has a negative intrinsic demand, its external demand can be sufficiently positive such that user 2's usage demand is positive. Next we study the general case for arbitrary number of users. For convenience, define
Also define C as the N × N matrix with each entry being c. For a UDE x * , let S be the set of users with positive usage in x * (i.e., x * i > 0, ∀i ∈ S and x * i = 0, ∀i / ∈ S). For convenience, let v S denote the |S| × 1 vector comprised of the entries of a vector v with indices in S, M S denote the |S| × |S| matrix comprised of the entries of a matrix M with indices in S × S, and [M] i,S denote the 1 × |S| vector comprised of the entries of the i th row of a matrix M with column indices in S. According to the best response function in (2), x * S is the solution to the system of equations
where 1 denotes the N × 1 vector of 1s. We need the following lemma:
Lemma 1: When conditions (3) and (4) 
The proof is given in Appendix E. Thus we have
When users have homogenous intrinsic coefficients, we can show that the same set of users have positive equilibrium usage at different prices.
Proposition 3: For Stage II, when users have the same intrinsic coefficient a (i.e., a i = a, ∀i ), the UDE x * (as a function of p) is given as follows:
and
The proof is given in Appendix F. Proposition 3 shows that the set of users with positive equilibrium usage (if they exist) does not change with the price, and each user's positive usage decreases as the price increases.
Then we show by a counterexample that when users have diverse intrinsic coefficients a i , a user's equilibrium usage may increase as the price increases. Consider a case for three users where a 1 = 2, a 2 = a 3 = 1.5, b i = 3, ∀i , c = 2, p = 0.4, and g 23 = g 32 = 4, g i j = 0, ∀{i, j } = {2, 3}. 4 We can show that there exists a unique UDE x * and it is the solution to the system of equations:
Solving these equations, we have x * 1 = 0.0571, x * 2 = 0.3286, x * 3 = 0.3286. When price p increases to 0.5, the new UDE is the solution to
which is x * 1 = 0.0714 > 0.0571, x * 2 = 0.2857, x * 3 = 0.2857. Thus the usage of user 1 increases.
Remarks: Intuitively, as the price increases, the usage of both users 2 and 3 decreases and the intrinsic demand of user 1 decreases. However, user 1's external demand increases due to the decrease of congestion effect, and its increase is larger than the decrease of user 1's intrinsic demand, such that the sum of its intrinsic and external demands increases. In addition, since user 1 has a larger intrinsic coefficient than users 2 and 3 have, it has positive usage x * 1 = 0.0714 even when its external demand is negative due to the congestion effect. Indeed, if user 1 has the same intrinsic coefficient a 1 = 1.5 as users 2 and 3 have, then we can show that its usage is x * 1 = 0. From this example, we can see that if the wireless provider increases the price, it may observe that some users with weak social ties with others increase their usage.
Furthermore, when users have diverse intrinsic coefficients a i , we have the following result.
Proposition 4: For Stage II, the UDE x * (as a function of p) is given as follows:
and x * i = 0, ∀i / ∈ S k . The proof is given in Appendix G. Proposition 4 shows that each user's equilibrium usage is a piece-wise linear function of price (as illustrated in Fig. 5 ): within each price 4 Note that (3) holds under this setting. interval [ p k , p k+1 ], the equilibrium usage is a linear function of price p.
Next we investigate the impact of other parameters on the UDE.
Proposition 5: For Stage II, when users have the same intrinsic coefficient a (i.e., a i = a, ∀i ) and symmetric social ties (i.e., g i j = g j i , ∀i = j ), the total usage attained by the UDE increases as 1) the intrinsic coefficient a increases, or 2) social tie levels g i j , ∀i = j increase, or 3) intrinsic coefficients b i , ∀i = j decrease, or 4) the congestion coefficient c decreases.
The proof is given in Appendix H. We illustrate Proposition 5 by an example in Figs. 6 and 7. As discussed earlier, users' social ties tend to be symmetric due to social reciprocity [29] . In Section VI, our simulation results will show that the performance under asymmetric social ties is very close to that under symmetric social ties. Then we show by a counterexample that if the social network is not symmetric, the total equilibrium usage may decrease when the system parameters change accordingly.
Note that condition (3) holds under this setting. We can show that there exists a unique UDE x * and it is the solution to the system of equations below:
Solving these equations, we have x * 1 = 0.5, x * 2 = 0.2, and x * 3 = 0.2 with total usage t (x * ) = 0.9. When b 1 decreases to 0.5, the new UDE is the solution to
which is x * 1 = 0.67, x * 2 = 0.1 and x * 3 = 0.1 such that the total usage t (x * ) = 0.87 < 0.9 decreases. Similarly, when a 1 , g 12 , or g 13 increases, we can also observe a decrease of the total usage.
Remarks: Intuitively, the total usage may decrease as a user's intrinsic valuation or social ties increase, because the network effect and congestion effect are not symmetric: both users 2 and 3 experience congestion effect from user 1, while user 1 experiences neither congestion effect nor network effect from user 2 or 3. As a result, when user 1's usage increases, it results in usage decrease for both users 2 and 3 such that their total usage decrease is larger than user 1's usage increase. This example shows that, if a user has asymmetric social ties with others, then the total usage may decrease as the user's intrinsic valuation or social ties increase.
V. OPTIMAL PRICING IN STAGE I
In the previous section, we have investigated the UDE in Stage II given a price chosen by the wireless provider. In this section, we study the optimal pricing of the provider in Stage I. We first observe from Proposition 4 that the total usage is a piece-wise linear function of price (as illustrated in Fig. 5) . As a result, the total revenue is a piece-wise quadratic function of price (as illustrated in Fig. 8 ). Based on this observation, we develop an algorithm that computes the optimal price to maximize the provider's revenue, as described in Algorithm 3. The basic idea is to first determine the price intervals that Fig. 9 . Probability of social edge vs. number of users in real data trace [30] .
characterize the piece-wise structure, such that within each price interval, the set of users with positive usage is the same at any price. Then we find the optimal price within each interval that maximizes the revenue. Thus we can find the optimal price with the maximum revenue among all the price intervals.
In particular, Algorithm 3 starts with computing the set of users S with positive usage at price 0 by using Algorithm 1 (line 1-7). Then this set S serves as the initial condition for the following steps. As the price p increases from 0 to max i∈N a i (the largest possible value of the optimal price according to Theorem 4), it iteratively finds the critical prices at which the set S changes (line 9-20). In each iteration, given the current critical price p, the next critical price p is the minimum price larger than p at which some user i ∈ S with positive usage decreases its usage to 0 (line 10-14), or some user i / ∈ S with usage 0 increases it to positive usage 5 (line [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . Within each price interval [ p, p] , as the revenue R is a quadratic function of price p, the optimal price in [ p, p] that maximizes the revenue is the pricep such that , p] ; otherwise, the optimal price is one of the endpoints p and p (line [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] . By comparing the maximum revenues at the optimal prices for all the price intervals (line [33] [34] [35] [36] , the algorithm finds the optimal price in the entire price range [0, max i∈N a i ].
Theorem 4: Algorithm 3 finds the optimal price in Stage I. The proof is given in Appendix I. In the next section, our simulation results will show that the computational complexity of Algorithm 3 is linear in the number of users and is low.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first use simulation results to evaluate the performance of the two-stage game for the mobile users and the wireless provider. Then we discuss the engineering insights that can be drawn from the simulation results.
A. Simulation Setup
To illustrate the impacts of different parameters of mobile social networks on the performance, we consider a random setting as follows. We simulate the social graph G using the Erdős-Rényi (ER) graph model [31] , where each pair of 5 Recall that some user's equilibrium usage may increase when the price increases as illustrated by the example in Section IV. users have an undirected social edge between them with the same probability P S , independently of the other pairs of users. We also simulate the social network according to the real data trace from Brightkite [30] , which is a social friendship network based on mobile phone users. The real data is in the form of a social network with undirected edges. For this data trace, we plot the average number of social edges between any two users versus the number of users in Fig. 9 . For each pair of users, if they have no social edge, we set their mutual social ties as 0; otherwise, we set their mutual social ties as symmetric and following a normal distribution N(μ G , 2) with mean μ G and variance 2. We also set each intrinsic coefficient a i as following the same normal distribution N(μ A , 2), and each intrinsic coefficient b i as following the same normal distribution N(μ B , 2). We set default parameter values as follows: N = 10, P S = 0.8, μ A = 4, μ B = 10, μ G = 4, c = 4.
As a benchmark, we evaluate the performance when users demand non-socially-aware usage (NSU) in comparison to our proposed socially-aware usage (SU). Since NSU is a special case of SU with all social ties being 0, the UDE and optimal pricing for NSU can be computed as for SU. To highlight the performance comparison, we normalize the results with respect to NSU. We also compare the performances under SU with ER model based social graph (SU-ER) and with real data based social graph (SU-real). 
B. Simulation Results
1) Total Usage in Stage II:
We first evaluate the performance of total usage in Stage II.
We illustrate the impacts of P S , μ G , c on total usage in Figs. 10-12, respectively. As expected, we observe from all these figures that SU always dominates NSU, and can perform significantly better than NSU. From Figs. 10-11, we can see that the performance gain of SU over NSU increases as P S or μ G increases, and the marginal gain is also increasing. Similarly, we can see from Fig. 12 that the performance gain of SU over NSU increases as congestion coefficient c decreases, and the marginal gain is also increasing. We also evaluate the performance under SU with ER model based the asymmetric social graph. We observe that its performance is very close to that with the symmetric social graph. Fig. 13 illustrates the impact of N on total usage. As expected, we observe that the total usage always increases with the number of users. However, for the case of NSU and SU-real, the marginal gain of total usage decreases with the number of users, while for the case of SU-ER, the marginal gain increases. Intuitively, in the former case, when a new user joins the network, as the new user's social ties with the existing users are weak, the congestion effect between the new user and the existing users outweighs the network effect between them. Furthermore, as more users exist in the network, the weight difference between the congestion effect and the network effect increases, and thus the marginal gain of total usage by adding a user decreases. In the latter case, as the new user's social ties with the existing users are strong, the roles of the congestion effect and network effect are switched.
2) Optimal Price in Stage I: Next we evaluate the performance of the optimal price and optimal revenue in Stage I. Fig. 14 illustrates the optimal price as the number of users increases. We observe that the optimal price always decreases with the number of users. Intuitively, this is because as the number of users increases, more users have higher intrinsic demands, so that increasing the price does not result in significant decrease in total usage. Comparing different curves, we can also see that the optimal price decreases as P S increases from 0 to 0.5 and then to 0.8. Intuitively, this is because that when network effect is strong, a low price is desirable, since it encourages users' intrinsic usage which further stimulate significantly more usage due to the network effect; when congestion effect is strong, a high price is desirable, since decreasing the price cannot encourage significantly more usage due to the congestion effect. Fig. 15 illustrates the optimal revenue achieved at the optimal price as the number of users increases. As expected, we can make similar observations as for Fig. 13 : when network effect dominates congestion effect, the marginal gain of the revenue by adding more users is increasing; when congestion effect dominates network effect, the marginal gain is decreasing. Fig. 16 illustrates the computational complexity of Algorithm 3 as the number of users increases. The number of iterations is equal to the number of price intervals that determine the piece-wise structure of total usage and revenue as a function of price. We observe that the complexity is O(N).
C. Further Discussions
Based on the simulation results, we can draw the following engineering insights for the operation of wireless providers.
• The observations from Figs. 10-12 suggest that as users' social ties increase (which can be promoted by social services), the wireless provider can receive an increasing total usage and thus an increasing revenue, with increasing marginal gains. In addition, the wireless provider can receive an increasing marginal return by reducing the network congestion.
• The observations from Figs. 13 and 15 suggest that the wireless provider should know whether the network effect determined by users' social ties dominates the congestion effect. If the network effect dominates, it receives an increasing marginal gain by taking in more users; if the congestion effect dominates, the marginal gain is decreasing and the total usage will saturate when the number of users is sufficiently large.
• The observations from Fig. 14 suggest that the wireless provider should set a low price when users' social ties are strong (evidenced by the popularity of social services), as the price decrease will be outweighed by the total usage increase due to network effect, such that the total revenue increases. When the social ties are weak, the wireless provider should set a high price, as cutting the price cannot stimulate sufficiently more usage due to the congestion effect to compensate the price decrease.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK In this paper, we have cast the interplay between mobile users and a wireless provider as a Stackelberg game, by jointly considering the social network effect in the social domain and the congestion effect in the physical wireless domain. For Stage II, we have analyzed users' demand equilibrium given a price chosen by the wireless provider. For Stage I, we have developed an algorithm to compute the optimal price to maximize the wireless provider's revenue. We have also conducted simulations using real data to evaluate the performance, and drawn useful engineering insights for the operation of wireless providers.
For future work, one interesting direction is to study the provider's pricing strategy when it is allowed to differentiate the price across different users. In this case, the price offered to each user will depend on its social influence to others based on the social network. Differential pricing with network effect only has been studied in [7] . It is also of interest to consider the presence of multiple wireless providers and study the interactions of their pricing strategies [32] . Another future direction is to evaluate the idea of socially-aware mobile data usage via machine learning tools based on real data of mobile users' data usage. The data usage model proposed in this paper can serve as the basic model. Machine learning tools can be leveraged to learn the parameter values that best fit the real data of user's data usage. Then, this model with tuned parameters can be used to estimate and predict users' real data usage. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
To show the existence of a UDE, we make use of the following lemma, which shows that the Stage II game with unbounded usage range is equivalent to that with bounded usage range. Proof: Let x * be any UDE of game G (if a UDE exists) and x * i be the largest in x * , i.e., x * i ≥ x * j , ∀i = j . If x * i > 0, using the best response function in (2), we have
Using (3), it follows from (7) that
Since x * i is the largest in x * , we have x * j ∈ [0,x], ∀ j ∈ N , and thus x * ∈ [0,x] N . Therefore, as game G and game G have the same set of payoff functions and the strategy spaces in both games contain [0,x] N , they have the same set of UDEs.
Using a celebrated result in [33] - [35] , the infinite game G admits a UDE if the strategy space [0,x] N is compact and convex, the payoff function u i (x i , x −i ) is continuous in x i and x −i , and the payoff function u i (x i , x −i ) is concave in x i . It is easy to check that all these conditions hold, and thus the game G admits a UDE. Then it follows from Lemma 2 that the Stage II game G admits a UDE.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We will show that the UDE is unique by showing that the game G defined in Lemma 2 is a concave game.
The Jacobian matrix u(x) of the payoff function profile u(x) (u 1 (x), . . . , u N (x) ) of game G is given by
Using (3), it follows that
where [M] i j denotes the entry in the i th row and j th column of matrix M. Therefore, B − G is strictly diagonally dominant [36] . It follows from the condition j =i |g ji −c|
T is strictly diagonally dominant. Also observe that it is symmetric. It is known that a symmetric matrix that is strictly diagonally dominant with real nonnegative diagonal entries is positive definite [36] . Therefore, u(x) + u(x) T is negative definite. It follows from [13, Th. 6 ] that u(x) is strictly diagonally concave. Therefore, using [13, Th. 2] , game G has a unique UDE.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
For any i ∈ N , according to step 6 in Algorithm 1, we have
Then, using (3) and (8), we have
According to (3), we have max i∈N j =i |g i j −c| b i +c < 1. Then it follows that the algorithm results in a contraction mapping of | x (t ) i |, and thus converges to the UDE.
D. Proof of Proposition 2
If the UDE is positive, i.e., x * 1 > 0 and x * 2 > 0, according to (2), we have x * > 0 is the solution to
Solving it, we have the expression given in the low price regime. Then observe that x * 1 and x * 2 are both positive when p = 0, and decrease when p increases. Also observe that
, and x * 2 = 0 when
. We can check that p 1 ≥ p 2 . Therefore, when p > p 2 = p th , we have x * 1 > 0 and x * 2 = 0. (2) . Then we further observe that x * 1 = x * 2 = 0 when p > a 1 .
E. Proof of Lemma 1
We only prove the case when S = N , since the case when S ⊂ N can be proved similarly. Let
SinceB is a diagonal matrix with positive diagonal entries, it is invertible. Let λ be any eigenvalue ofB −1Ḡ with v being the corresponding eigenvector. Let v i be the largest entry of v in absolute value, i.e., |v i | ≥ |v j |, ∀ j . Since (B −1Ḡ )v = λv, it follows that
where the last inequality follows from (3). It follows that the spectral radius ofB −1Ḡ is strictly less than 1. Since each eigenvalue of I −B −1Ḡ is equal to 1 − λ where λ is an eigenvalue ofB −1Ḡ , where I denotes the N × N identity matrix, it follows that I −B −1Ḡ has no eigenvalue of 0, and thus is invertible. Thus B − G =B −Ḡ =B(I −B −1Ḡ ) is also invertible.
F. Proof of Proposition 3
We first show part 1). Suppose p > a and x * i > 0 is the largest in x * , i.e., x * i ≥ x * j , ∀i = j . Using the best response function in (2), we have
where the last inequality follows from (3). This shows a contradiction. Thus we have x * i = 0, ∀i . Next we show part 2). Let S be the set of users with positive usage in x * at price 0. For any i / ∈ S, using (2), we have
For any p ∈ (0, a], we next show that x with x S = (a − p)(B S − G S ) −1 1 S and x i = 0, ∀i / ∈ S is the UDE at price p. We observe that for any i ∈ S, x i is its best response at x . For any i / ∈ S, using (9), we have
and thus is user i 's best response at x .
G. Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of part 1) is the same as the proof of part 1) of Proposition 3 except that a should change to max i∈N a i . Now we show part 2). For any price p ∈ [0, max i∈N a i ], the usage of the set of users S with positive usage at the UDE (if they exist) is given by (6) . Observe that the usage demand a i − p b i +c + j =i g i j −c b i +c x * j of any user i at the UDE is a continuous function of price p and other users' usage x * j . Therefore, when the price p increases by a sufficiently small amount to p , the set of user with positive usage at the UDE is still the set S, and thus their usage is still given by (6) except with p replaced by p . Therefore, the set of user with positive usage is the same at any price in a continuous price interval. Then the desired result follows.
H. Proof of Proposition 5
We only prove the case when any g i j increases, since the cases when a increases, any b i decreases, or c increases can be proved similarly. Then it suffices to prove the case when any g i j increases by any small amount. Let G be a symmetric matrix. Let x * be the UDE under G and S be the set of users with positive usage in x * . It is easy to check that the UDE is a continuous function of the matrix G. Then we can always find a symmetric matrix G with [G ] i j ≥ [G] i j , ∀i, j and at least one strict inequality, such that the set of users with positive usage at the UDE x under G is also S. Therefore, using the best response function (2), we have
Subtracting (10) from (11), we have
where G S G S − G S . According to Lemma 1, B S − G S is invertible. Then it follows from (12) that
On the other hand, it follows from (10) that
Using (13) and (14), we have
where the third equality is due to the fact that (B S − G S ) −1 is symmetric since B S − G S is symmetric. Since a > p and x * S , G, x S only have nonnegative entries, it follows that t (x ) ≥ t (x * ).
I. Proof of Theorem 4
We will show that given the current critical price p and the set of users S with positive usage at the UDE at the price p, each iteration from step 8 to step 43 finds the next critical price p, and the optimal price and revenue in the price interval [ p, p] . For any i ∈ S with x * i > 0, it follows from (6) that
Therefore, x * i decreases when the price p increases if
For any i / ∈ S with x * i = 0, it follows from (2) that the usage demand of user i is no greater than 0 such that
Therefore, the usage demand of user i / ∈ S increases when the price p increases if
Using (15) , the price at which a user i ∈ S changes its usage from positive to 0 is
where S is the set of users such that (16) holds. Using (17) , the price at which a user i / ∈ S changes its usage from 0 to positive isp
where S is the set of users such that (18) holds. Therefore, the next critical price p is p = min i∈S ∪S p i .
Using (6) , the revenue R is given by
which is a concave quadratic function of p. By setting ∂ R( p) ∂p = 0, we obtain that the optimal price p in the price interval [ p, p] Then the optimal price and revenue in the entire range [0, max i∈N a i ] is found by comparing the optimal revenue for all the iterations from step 8 to step 43.
